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Delucchi v. Songer, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (June 29, 2017)1 
 
TORTS: APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court held that the portions of the Nevada anti-SLAPP statute’s 2013 
amendments that defined protected conduct resolved an ambiguity and apply retroactively. 
The Court further held that the portions of the 2013 amendments that changed the summary 
judgment standard of review to clear and convincing effected a substantive change and do 
not apply retroactively.  
 
Background 
 
 In May 2012, appellants Raymond Delucchi and Tommy Hollis were involved in 
an incident on Highway 160 while working as Pahrump Valley Fire and Rescue Service 
paramedics. Delucchi and Hollis were driving their ambulance to Pahrump when they were 
flagged down by passing motorists James and Brittnie Choyce. Ms. Choyce had miscarried, 
and the couple stopped Delucchi and Hollis to request transport to a hospital in Las Vegas. 
For reasons that are still in dispute, Delucchi and Hollis did not transport Ms. Choyce to a 
hospital.  
 The Choyces made a complaint. In June 2012, the town of Pahrump (“Pahrump”) 
investigated the incident through its outside counsel who retained Pat Songer, Director of 
Emergency Services at Humboldt General Hospital. Songer recommended that Delucchi 
and Hollis be terminated.  
 Delucchi, Hollis, and their union challenged the termination at a four-day 
arbitration hearing. The arbitrator found that there was not just cause for Delucchi’s and 
Hollis’s terminations and ordered reinstatement. The arbitrator concluded that Songer’s 
report “lacked reliability, contained misrepresentations, and was not an adequate basis for 
termination.”  
 In June 2014, Delucchi and Hollis filed a lawsuit against Songer and Pahrump’s 
outside counsel, the law firm Erickson, Thorpe, & Swainston, Ltd. (“ETS”)2 alleging 
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Pahrump’s 
investigation and the Songer report. Songer filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes. Delucchi and Hollis opposed and argued that “(1) the 
Songer report was unprotected conduct under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes; (2) under the 
pre-2013 version of the anti-SLAPP statute, Delucchi and Hollis demonstrated a genuine 
issue of material fact to defeat the motion; and (3) while the pre-2013 version should apply 
to Songer’s 2012 conduct, they could nevertheless demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence a probability of prevailing on their claims.”  
 The district court determined that the 2013 amendments clarified the legislative 
intent, and so applied the 2013 amendments retroactively in deciding Songer’s motion to 
dismiss. The district court applied the statute’s two-step analysis: (1) the defendant must 
demonstrate that the communication was protected, and (2) if so demonstrated, the burden 
                                                        
1  By Krystina Butchart. 
2  ETS is no longer a party to this lawsuit. 
shifts to the plaintiffs to show a probability of prevailing on their claims. “The district court 
found that Songer demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his report was 
protected good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech on an issue 
of public concern under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes because (1) it was a communication 
of information to Pahrump regarding a matter reasonably of concern to Pahrump based on 
the incident, and (2) it was a written statement made in direct connection with an issue 
under consideration by Pahrump authorized by law in the disciplinary actions against 
Delucchi and Hollis.”3 The district court found that Delucchi and Hollis failed to meet their 
burden. 4  The district court granted Songer’s special motion to dismiss. This appeal 
followed.  
 
Discussion 
 
Legislative amendments to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes 
 
 When the Legislature amends a statute, “[t]here is a general presumption in favor 
of prospective application.” 5  When an amendment clarifies, rather than substantively 
changes a prior statute, the amendment has retroactive effect.6  
 The 2013 amendments were in response to a ruling from the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell.7 One amendment clarified that the anti-
SLAPP protection’s scope is not limited to a communication made directly to a 
governmental agency.8 Therefore, the Court concluded that this amendment to NRS 41.637 
was meant to clarify legislative intent in response to Metabolic Research, and thus, 
retroactive application of that statute is proper.9 
 The pre-2013 version of NRS 41.660 provided that special motions under Nevada’s 
anti-SLAPP statutes were treated as motions for summary judgment.10 Therefore, before 
the 2013 amendments, the party filing a special motion to dismiss had the “initial burden 
                                                        
3  See 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 176, §§ 1 and 3.  
4  See id. §3(3)(b), 623–24. NRS 41.660(3)(b) was amended again in 2015, and under that amendment, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate “with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.” However, 
under the 2013 version, a plaintiff had to establish “by clear and convincing evidence a probability of 
prevailing on the claim.” 2013 Nev Stat., ch. 176.  
5  See McKellar v. McKellar, 110 Nev. 200, 203, 871 P.2d 296, 298 (1994).  
6  Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. 28, 35 n.6, 222, P.3d 1031, 1035 n.6 (2010); see also In re Estate of 
Thomas, 116 Nev. 492, 495, 998 P.2d 560, 562 (2000) (explaining that “[w]here a former statute is 
amended, or a doubtful interpretation of a former statute rendered certain by subsequent legislation, it has 
been held that such amendment is persuasive evidence of what the Legislature intended by the first statute” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Sheriff, Washoe Cty. V. Smith, 91 Nev. 729, 734, 542, P.2d 440, 443 
(1975)); 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction §22.34 (7 th ed. 
2009) (“Where an amendment clarifies existing law but does not contravene previous constructions of the 
law, the amendment may be deemed curative, remedial and retroactive, especially where the amendment is 
enacted during a controversy over the meaning of the law.”). 
7  693 F.3d 795, 800–02 (9th Cir. 2012) (which held that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP provisions only protect 
communications made directly to a governmental agency, and only protected defendants from liability, not 
from suit, and that there was no right to an immediate appeal from an order denying a special motion to 
dismiss). 
8  See 2013 Nev. Stat., ch. 176, § 1, at 623.  
9  See McKellar, 110 Nev. at 203, 871 P.2d at 298.  
10  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.660 (1997). 
of production and persuasion. This means the moving party must first make a threshold 
showing that the lawsuit is based on” a protected communication pursuant to NRS 
41.637.11  
 The Court concluded that NRS 41. 637 and NRS 41.660 were the applicable statutes 
and applied each to the case in reviewing the district court’s holdings. In so doing, the 
Court concluded that the Songer report was not a protected communication. The Court 
further concluded that Delucchi and Hollis presented sufficient evidence to defeat Songer’s 
special motion under the summary judgment standard.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 The 2013 amendments to NRS 41.637 were meant to clarify legislative intent, thus 
making retroactive application of the statute’s amendments proper. The Court concluded 
that the district court erred in requiring Delucchi and Hollis to establish a probability of 
prevailing on the defamation and IIED claims by clear and convincing evidence based on 
the 2013 version of NRS 41.660. The Court further concluded that Delucchi and Hollis 
presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, and the district court 
erred in granting Songer’s special motion to dismiss. The Court reversed the district court’s 
order granting Songer’s special motion, and remanded to the district court to enter an order 
denying Songer’s motion.  
 
                                                        
11  John v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 746, 754, 219 P.3d 1276, 1282 (2009). 
